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GILLETT-NETTING v. BARNHART AND 
UNANSWERED QUESTIONS ABOUT SOCIAL 
SECURITY BENEFITS FOR POSTHUMOUSLY 
CONCEIVED CHILDREN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Cryopreservation1—the freezing of sperm for later use in assisted 
reproduction—provides an invaluable failsafe for men vulnerable to 
sterilization;2 however, using frozen sperm to conceive a child after a non-
anonymous sperm donor’s death creates bizarre and troubling scenarios. 
For example, William Kane wrote a letter, shortly before committing 
suicide in 1991, asking his girlfriend to conceive a child using his frozen 
sperm.3 In 1994, Mirabel Baez asked a medical examiner to extract sperm 
 1. See infra notes 23–29 and accompanying text. 
 2. Professor Leach predicted legal issues caused by sperm donation in 1962. See W. Barton 
Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and the Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A. J. 942 
(1962). He believed sperm banks, created to protect astronauts’ sperm from mutation by space 
radiation, threatened the Rule against Perpetuities’s stability. Id. at 943–44. Before both the 1991 Gulf 
War and the 2003 Iraqi War, many soldiers, fearing sterilization by biological or chemical weapons, 
had their sperm frozen. See Kristine Knaplund, Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last Will, 46 
ARIZ. L. REV. 91, 91–92 (2004). This idea is not new; Montegazza predicted it in 1866. See Bruce L. 
Wilder, Assisted Reproduction Technology: Trends and Suggestions for the Developing Law, 18 J. 
AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 177, 178 (2002). Other common sperm freezers include men with cancer, 
who fear sterilization from chemotherapy, and athletes vulnerable to groin injuries. Knaplund, supra at 
91–92. 
 3. Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276–77 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). William Kane killed 
himself in a Las Vegas hotel room. Id. at 276. Deborah Hecht, Kane’s girlfriend, was thirty-eight years 
old and lived with him for the five years before his death. Id. Kane also had two adult children from a 
previous marriage. Id.  
 Before dying, Kane deposited fifteen vials of sperm in a California sperm bank. Id. Kane 
expressed his desire for a child with Deborah Hecht in his will’s “Statement of Wishes.” Id. at 276–77. 
Kane wrote a letter to his two living children discussing the possibility of Hecht having his 
posthumously conceived child. Id. Kane wrote: 
I address this to my children, because, although I have only two, Everett and Katy, it may be 
that Deborah will decide—as I hope she will—to have a child by me after my death. I’ve been 
assiduously generating frozen sperm samples for that eventuality. If she does, then this letter 
is for my posthumous offspring, as well, with the thought that I have loved you in my dreams, 
even though I never got to see you born.  
 If you are receiving this letter, it means that I am dead—whether by my own hand or that 
of another makes very little difference. I feel that my time has come; and I wanted to leave 
you with something more than a dead enigma that was your father. . . . I am inordinately 
proud of who I have been—what I made of me. I’m so proud of that that I would rather take 
my own life now than be ground into a mediocre existence by my enemies—who, because of 
my mistakes and bravado have gained the power to finish me. 
Id. at 277.  
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from her dead husband.4 In 1998, Jeremy Reno’s mother, who wanted to 
“be a grandma,” ordered doctors to keep her son alive until they surgically 
extracted his sperm.5 Furthermore, sperm from a deceased man has now 
been used to produce a child,6 and cryopreservation is becoming 
increasingly popular.7 While frozen sperm used during a man’s life causes 
no significant legal problems,8 children conceived with a decedent’s sperm 
complicate, inter alia, both the intestate9 and testate10 distribution of his 
estate.  
 4. Mirabel Baez’s husband died twenty-four hours earlier. Maggie Gallagher, About Sperm the 
Ultimate Deadbeat Dads, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1, 1994, at A28. Extraction of a deceased’s sperm is 
possible during the first twenty-four hours after death. See Sharona Hoffman & Andrew P. Morriss, 
Currents in Contemporary Ethics, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 721, 722 (2003). But see JESSE 
DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS & ESTATES 127 (6th ed. 2000) (stating a Los 
Angeles woman gave birth to a girl using her deceased husband’s sperm, extracted thirty hours after 
his death).  
 5. Laura Dwyer, Dead Daddies: Issues in Postmortem Reproduction, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 881, 
881–82 (2000). Nineteen-year-old Jeremy Reno shot himself during a game of Russian roulette. Id. at 
881. His mother, Pam Reno, said: “I told them I have to get my son’s sperm. It’s the only way I can 
become a grandma.” Id. She planned on using a donor egg to conceive an embryo with her son’s 
sperm; she then planned on contracting with a surrogate mother to carry the embryo. Id. Bioethicist 
Arthur Caplan correctly characterizes Mirabel Baez and Pam Reno’s behavior as “sort of like raping 
someone when he is dead.” Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Regulating Reproductive Technologies, 
21 J. LEGAL MED. 35, 55 (2000).  
 6. See Stephen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2005 WL 2210651 (M.D. Fla. 2005). In Stephen, a 
widow, whose husband died only two weeks after their wedding, had her husband’s sperm removed 
twenty-four hours after his death. Id. at *1. After several unsuccessful attempts at in vitro fertilization, 
the wife gave birth to a son four years after her husband’s death. Id. From 1980–1995, eighty-two 
girlfriends, widows, fiancées, and family members requested a postmortem sperm extraction. See 
Knaplund, supra note 2, at 93–94. In some states, such as California, postmortem sperm retrieval is 
illegal without prior consent from the deceased. See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 2260 (West 2003). 
Both the New York Task Force on Life and Law and an American Bar Association committee 
recommended making postmortem sperm extraction illegal without prior consent from the deceased. 
See Knaplund, supra note 2, at 94.  
 7. For statistics showing the increasing use of assisted reproductive technologies, see CENTER 
FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. SUCCESS RATES (2003), http://www.cdc.gov/ 
reproductivehealth/ART01/index.htm.  
 8. The Uniform Parentage Act does not treat a sperm donor as the parent unless he consents to 
being the parent. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702–703 (amended 2002).  
 9. For a general discussion of inheritance rights, see Jamie Rowsell, Note, Stayin’ Alive: 
Postmortem Reproduction and Inheritance Rights, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 400, 401–02 (2003). See also 
Kayla VanCannon, Note, Fathering a Child From the Grave: What are the Inheritance Rights of 
Children Born Through New Technology After the Death of a Parent?, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 331, 350–
58 (2004). For a theoretical discussion of property rights and frozen embryos, see Jessica Berg, 
Owning Persons: The Application of Property Theory to Embryos and Fetuses, 40 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 159 (2005).  
 10. See Lisa Burkdall, Note, A Dead Man’s Tale: Regulating the Right to Bequeath Sperm in 
California, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 875, 882–903 (1995). One major problem is the Rule Against 
Perpetuities: “A nonvested interest is good if is absolutely certain to vest, or fail to vest, not later than 
twenty-one years after the death of some life in being at the creation of the interest.” CORNELIUS J. 
MOYNIHAN & SHELDON F. KURTZ, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 243 (3d ed. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/5
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Implicating (and overlapping) the inheritance problem is the 
availability of Social Security survivor benefits (“Benefits”) to 
posthumously conceived children.11 A number of issues warrant 
consideration when examining the Benefits question: what relationship the 
birth mother must have with the deceased sperm donor; what qualifies as 
support from the decedent; whether to impose a time limit on conception; 
and whether children birthed by the decedent’s widow, who are conceived 
with his sperm, should be considered legitimate. Two state courts have 
addressed the inheritance problem,12 but the Ninth Circuit, in Gillett-
Netting v. Barnhart,13 became the first court to directly address the 
availability of Benefits to posthumously conceived children. 
This Note will provide an overview of pertinent reproductive 
techniques used in posthumous conception, previous cases examining 
posthumously conceived children’s inheritance rights, and Social Security. 
This Note will then explain why the Ninth Circuit correctly awarded the 
Gillett-Netting children Benefits. This Note will examine why the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning leaves posthumously conceived children overly reliant 
2002). For a discussion of how posthumously conceived children effect the Rule Against Perpetuities, 
see Sharona Hoffman & Andrew P. Morriss, Birth After Death: Perpetuities and the New 
Reproductive Technologies, 38 GA. L. REV. 575 (2004). See also Laura Heard, A Time to Be Born, a 
Time to Die: Alternative Reproduction and Texas Probate Law, 17 ST. MARY’S L.J. 927 (1986). 
 Similarly, posthumously conceived children interfere with the distribution of class gifts. See 
Knaplund, supra note 2, at 108–15 (recommending the rule of convenience’s use to exclude 
posthumously conceived children from being considered part of a class gift). As Professor Knaplund 
explains:  
The basic rule of convenience provides that the class will close whenever any member of the 
class is entitled to immediate possession and enjoyment of his or her share. While this is a 
rule of construction and not a rule of law, and is not applied where the testator has evidenced 
contrary intent, the rule is adhered to more closely than any other rule of construction. Once 
the class is closed, no person can be added to the class.  
Id. at 109 (internal quotations omitted). Thus, applying the rule of convenience prevents posthumously 
conceived children from being part of a class gift because they are not in being at the testator’s death. 
In Professor Knaplund’s view, the rule of convenience offers a simple solution to the complicated 
problems of a posthumously conceived child. See id. at 110–15. For a basic overview of class gifts, see 
MOYNIHAN & KURTZ, supra at 155. 
 11. See generally Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social 
Security Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251 (1999).  
 This issue’s resolution also implicates the posthumously conceived child’s birth mother because it 
may affect her eligibility for Social Security widow’s benefits. A widow is eligible for benefits if she 
is the required age and not entitled to retirement benefits equal to, or larger than, the deceased 
worker’s primary insurance amount. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(e) (2000). Additionally, she must file for the 
benefits and not be married. Id. Finally, she must meet one of six additional conditions; one condition 
requires the widow to be the biological mother of the deceased’s child(ren). See id.; see also 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.355 (2004). 
 12. See supra note 3, infra notes 41–61, and accompanying text. 
 13. 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004).  
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on state intestacy laws to prove their eligibility for Benefits. Finally, this 
Note will explain why Congress must amend the Social Security Act (the 
“Act”) to include posthumously conceived children, offering a proposed 
change to it. 
II. OVERVIEW 
A. The Gillett-Netting Facts 
Rhonda Gillett (“Gillett”) married Robert Netting (“Netting”) in 1993; 
shortly thereafter, they tried unsuccessfully to conceive a child.14 Netting 
was diagnosed with cancer in 1994.15 Before beginning chemotherapy, 
Netting had some of his sperm frozen;16 at that time, Netting knew his 
sperm could impregnate Gillett after his death.17 Additionally, Gillett 
claims Netting told her, a few months before dying, to continue trying to 
conceive a child even if he died.18 Eighteen months after Netting’s death, 
Gillett gave birth to twins conceived using his frozen sperm.19 The Social 
Security Administration then denied the Gillett-Netting twins’ (the 
“Twins”) application for Benefits.20 A federal district court affirmed the 
denial, holding the Twins did not meet the Act’s definition of child.21 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit awarded Benefits after determining the Twins 
were Netting’s children and met the Act’s dependency requirements.22 
B. Posthumous Conception 
For posthumous conception, the most important assisted reproduction 
technique23 is cryopreservation—the freezing of “human semen, ova, or 
 14. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 963 (D. Ariz. 2002). Gillett had problems 
becoming, and staying, pregnant. Id. She suffered two miscarriages before learning of a medical 
condition that interfered with her ability to conceive. Id.  
 15. Id.  
 16. Id. 
 17. Id.  
 18. Id. During Netting’s cancer treatment, Gillett continued her fertility treatments. Id.  
 19. Id.  
 20. Id. at 964. 
 21. See infra notes 130–42 and accompanying text.  
 22. See infra notes 143–53 and accompanying text.  
 23. A comprehensive treatment of assisted reproduction technologies is outside this Note’s 
scope. For an in-depth discussion of reproductive technologies, see Monica Shah, Modern 
Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 
17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 548–51 (1996). See also Stacy Sutton, Note, The Real Sexual Revolution: 
Posthumously Conceived Children, 73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 857, 862–76 (1999).  
 For treatment of the legal issues associated with assisted reproduction technologies, see Andrews 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/5
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embryos at very low temperatures for extended periods of time.”24 When 
needed, the sperm is thawed and commonly25 used in either artificial 
insemination26 or in vitro fertilization.27 At present, experts agree frozen 
sperm remains viable for at least a decade,28 while some claim a century.29 
In essence, cryopreservation can make a deceased man “fertile” for 
another “lifetime.” 
& Elster, supra note 5. 
 24. Banks, supra note 11, at 256–57 n.23. Cryopreservation was perfected in the early 1950s; in 
1953 the first successful pregnancy using frozen sperm occurred. See Wilder, supra note 2, at 178. 
Freezing sperm is the most common form of cryopreservation, and this Note will focus on it. The 
viability of frozen eggs has improved recently, and frozen eggs should receive the same legal 
treatment as frozen sperm. See Andrews & Elster, supra note 5, at 59–60 (noting the birth of twins 
using frozen eggs). Freezing unfertilized eggs is not a standard practice because their high liquid 
content and size make working with them difficult. See Hoffman & Morriss, supra note 4, at 722. 
Technology, however, is rapidly improving, and frozen eggs may ultimately supplant sperm as the best 
cryopreservation option. Id. Although frozen embryos can produce successful pregnancies, no case has 
dealt with frozen embryos used in posthumous conception. Moreover, the political and ethical issues 
associated with embryo manipulation do not fall within this Note’s scope. 
 25. Aside from in vitro fertilization and artificial insemination, additional methods of assisted 
reproduction exist. In gestational surrogacy the sperm and egg providers “enter into an agreement with 
a woman to gestate and give birth to the child and then release the child to them.” Laurence C. Nolan, 
Critiquing Society’s Response to the Needs of Posthumously Conceived Children, 82 OR. L. REV. 
1067, 1070 (2003). This technique differs from traditional surrogacy because the birth mother is not 
the genetic mother. In gamete intrafallopian transfer, fertilization occurs in the woman’s body, as the 
egg and sperm are injected directly into her fallopian tubes. Id. at 1071. In zygote intrafallopian 
transfer, the sperm and egg are fertilized using in vitro fertilization, and the fertilized egg is then 
injected directly into the woman’s fallopian tubes. Id. 
 At present, two experimental techniques exist. Wilder, supra note 2, at 189–90. Intracytoplasmic 
transfer takes the nuclear DNA contained in one woman’s egg and injects it into another woman’s egg 
that has had its nuclear DNA removed. Wilder, supra note 2, at 189. This process results in the egg 
having “a genome whose make-up derived from both women.” Id. Intracytoplasmic transfer assumes 
that something in an infertile woman’s eggs cytoplasm, the non-nuclear part of the cell, prevents in 
vitro fertilization from resulting in a successful pregnancy. Id. Haploidization, presently untested in 
humans, clones a sperm or egg using DNA from an “adult somatic cell,” such as a white blood cell or 
skin cell. Id. at 190. 
 26. Artificial insemination involves introducing sperm into the woman’s vagina, cervical canal, 
or uterus. See VanCannon, supra note 9, at 339. The first recorded artificial insemination occurred in 
1785. See Wilder, supra note 2, at 177.  
 Artificial insemination using frozen sperm does have a lower success rate (eight to ten percent) 
than using freshly harvested sperm (sixteen to eighteen percent). See Knaplund, supra note 2, at 96. 
Aside from a lower success rate, the other significant deterrent is expense. Artificial insemination costs 
$300 to $700 a cycle, with most women needing three to six cycles. Id. at 97. If artificial insemination 
fails, then another method, such as in vitro fertilization, becomes necessary. Id. After exhausting 
artificial insemination, the expense becomes prohibitive. For example, each attempted in vitro 
fertilization costs $8000 to $15,000. Id. 
 27. In vitro fertilization involves “removing ova, then adding sperm to the ova, and finally 
implanting any resulting preembyro(s) from the union of the sperm and the ova into the woman’s 
womb.” VanCannon, supra note 9, at 339.  
 28. See Banks, supra note 11, at 270.  
 29. See Rowsell, supra note 9, at 401. 
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Although Congress has remained silent about posthumously conceived 
children,30 commentators have addressed them.31 The Uniform Status of 
Children of Assisted Conception Act, written in 1988, does not treat an 
individual as the parent if the embryo, egg, or sperm is not implanted in 
the mother before the individual’s death.32 The Uniform Parentage Act 
treats the decedent as the father if he consented, in writing, to posthumous 
conception.33  
Other states have enacted laws addressing posthumously conceived 
children.34 In North Dakota, a man who dies before his sperm is used to 
conceive a child is not the child’s father.35 Florida treats the decedent as 
 30. Other countries have also addressed posthumous conception. For example, Germany, 
Sweden, Canada, and Australia (the state of Victoria) passed legislation prohibiting “posthumous 
assisted reproduction.” Margaret Ward Scott, Comment, A Look at the Rights and Entitlements of 
Posthumously Conceived Children: No Surefire Way to Tame the Reproductive Wild West, 52 EMORY 
L.J. 963, 969 (2003). Western Australia prohibits use of a person’s gametes after death and requires 
any existing gametes be destroyed within one year of the donor’s death. Id. at 970. Conversely, Israel 
allows a surviving wife to use embryos, created with her husband’s sperm, for up to one year after his 
death, regardless of his consent. Id. If the wife dies, Israel does not allow another woman to use the 
embryo. Id. Britain allows posthumous insemination when the deceased donor gave written consent. 
Id.  
 31. The Restatement of Property and Donative Transfers considers posthumously conceived 
children “in being” at the decedent’s death, provided the child is born within “a reasonable time.” 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS & DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 15.1 cmt. j (Tentative Draft 
No. 4, 2004). Professor Chester suggests adding § 2-108(b) to the Uniform Probate Code. Ronald 
Chester, Posthumously Conceived Heirs Under a Revised Uniform Probate Code, 38 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 727, 730–32 (2004). Section 2-108(b) would allow posthumous children to inherit if 
the “putative parent gave consent in record to a posthumous conception,” and the complaint asking for 
a determination of the child’s status “is filed . . . within three years of the putative parent’s death.” Id. 
at 730–31. 
 Bruce Wilder, chair of the Reproductive and Genetic Technologies Committee of the ABA Family 
Law Section, suggests that federal legislation should impose a two-year time limit when determining 
whether a posthumous child could be considered the deceased’s heir. See Stephanie Ward, Posthumous 
Kids Get Social Security, 3 No. 24 A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 4 (June 18, 2004).  
 32. Unif. Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act § 4(b) (1988).  
 33. Unif. Parentage Act § 707 (2000) (amended 2002). The section states:  
If an individual who consented in a record to be a parent by assisted reproduction dies before 
placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the deceased individual is not a parent of the resulting 
child unless the deceased spouse consented in a record that if assisted reproduction were to 
occur after death, the deceased individual would be a parent of the child. 
Id. Delaware, Texas, and Wyoming have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
13, § 8-707 (2004); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 160.707 (Vernon 2002); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-907 
(2004). Washington has adopted the act’s substance, but not its language. See WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 26.26.730 (2002). 
 34. For example, Virginia treats the decedent as the parent if the decedent consented to being the 
parent in writing. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-158 (2004). Additionally, the child must be born within ten 
months of his death. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164 (2004). 
 35. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04 (1997). The statute reads: “A person who dies before a 
conception using that person’s sperm or egg is not a parent of any resulting child born of the 
conception.” Id. For an overview of the model rules and state laws affecting posthumously conceived 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol83/iss5/5
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the father if the decedent provided for the child in his will.36 Louisiana 
allows a posthumously conceived child to inherit from the decedent if he 
consented to posthumous conception in writing, the surviving spouse is the 
child’s mother, and the child is born within three years of his death.37 
California allows a posthumously conceived child to inherit from the 
decedent if the child proves the decedent consented to his genetic 
material’s use in posthumous conception.38 Finally, Massachusetts and 
New Jersey courts have construed existing statutes to treat a posthumously 
conceived child as a decedent’s heir in certain situations.39  
Few American cases40 have addressed posthumously conceived 
children’s inheritance rights. In 1994, Hart v. Shalala41 raised the issue of 
whether a posthumously conceived child had a right to Benefits.42 The 
federal district court, however, never reached a decision on this issue 
because the Social Security Commissioner settled the case by awarding 
Benefits.43  
children, see Knaplund, supra note 2, at 97–103.  
 36. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.17 (West 1997). The statute states: 
A child conceived from the eggs or sperm of a person or persons who died before the transfer 
of their eggs, sperm, or pre-embryos to a woman’s body shall not be eligible for a claim 
against the decedent’s estate unless the child has been provided for by the decedent’s will. 
Id.  
 37. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:391.1(A) (West 2004). For a discussion of Louisiana’s treatment of 
posthumously conceived children, see Brianne M. Star, Comment, A Matter of Life and Death: 
Posthumous Conception, 64 LA. L. REV. 613, 620–22 (2004).  
 38. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 249.5 (West Supp. 2005). This statute treats posthumously 
conceived children as existing during the decedent’s lifetime if the decedent consented in writing to 
posthumous conception using his genetic material, and the child is in utero within two years of his 
death. Id. A court can order distribution of a decedent’s estate without harming the posthumously 
conceived child’s rights. See id. at § 249.8.  
 39. See infra notes 44–64 and accompanying text.  
 40. Foreign courts have dealt with posthumously conceived children. The most “widely 
discussed” case occurred in France when the widow of Alain Parpalaix asked to use her deceased 
husband’s frozen sperm to conceive a child. Scott, supra note 30, at 968. The widow argued that 
Parpalaix stored the sperm, before succumbing to cancer, because he wanted to produce heirs. Id. 
Although Parpalaix’s contract with the sperm bank had no provision addressing postmortem sperm 
use, a French court approved the widow’s request. Id. Following this decision, the sperm bank adopted 
a policy prohibiting postmortem insemination, which French courts have upheld. Id. at 970. In 1994, 
France passed a law forbidding postmortem insemination. Id. 
 In 1984, Mario and Elsa Rios died in a plane crash, leaving frozen embryos at a fertility clinic in 
Melbourne, Australia. Id. at 968. A question arose if another couple could use the embryos. Id. at 969. 
An Australian court decided that another couple could use them, but any resulting child could not 
inherit from the Rios’ estate. Id.  
 In 1996, the Tasmanian Supreme Court held that a frozen embryo, once born, can inherit its 
deceased father’s estate. Id. at 970. In essence, the Tasmanian Supreme Court extended “the policy of 
intestate succession that typically applies to posthumous births” to posthumous conception. Id.  
 41. See Banks, supra note 10, at 251–56. 
 42. Id. 
 43. See id. at 255–56. When announcing the Social Security Administration would settle the 
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In re estate of Kolacy44 raised the issue of whether posthumously 
conceived twins were the heirs of their mother’s deceased husband.45 The 
Kolacy twins wanted this declaration to establish their eligibility for 
Benefits.46 After stipulating that the federal judiciary had jurisdiction over 
the Benefits question, the court decided the twins were the deceased 
husband’s heirs.47 Although the intestacy statute’s plain language 
seemingly prevented the twins from being the husband’s legal heirs,48 the 
court held the statute’s basic purpose is to allow children to take property 
from their parents.49 Thus, once paternity is established, a posthumously 
conceived child should receive the legal status of heir.50 The court 
explained a “fundamental policy of the law” should be to “enlarge the 
rights of a human being to the maximum extent possible”51 and 
emphasized that New Jersey’s legislature should resolve this intestacy 
question.52  
case, the Social Security Commissioner stated that resolution of this issue “should involve the 
executive and legislative branches, rather than the courts.” Id.  
 If an applicant for Benefits disagrees with the initial determination of its claim, the applicant may 
appeal. See generally 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.901–404.955 (2004). First, an applicant may ask for a 
redetermination. Id. § 404.907. If the redetermination does not meet the applicant’s expectations, then 
an administrative law judge may hear the appeal. Id. § 404.944. If the applicant still disagrees with the 
decision, the applicant can either have the Appeals Council review the decision or file an action in 
federal court. Id. § 404.966.  
 44. 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).  
 45. Id. Fearing sterility from chemotherapy, the deceased husband froze his sperm after learning 
he had leukemia. He died one year later at the age of twenty-six. Id.  
 46. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2) (2000). Concurrently, the twins were pursing their Benefits claim 
with the Social Security Administration. Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259. For an overview of the claims 
process within the Social Security Administration, see supra note 43.  
 47. Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1259–60. The Kolacy court explained that the twins’ status as the 
decedent’s heirs was a state-law question. Id.  
 48. The relevant section, which is now repealed, provided: “Relatives of the decedent conceived 
before his death but born thereafter inherit as if they had been born in the lifetime of the decedent.” Id. 
at 1259–60. The Kolacy court explained this statute “is part of that traditional recognition of 
exceptions to the rule that takers from a decedent’s estate should be determined as of the date” of his 
death. Id. at 1261. The court noted the statute’s legislative history indicates it is a carryover from 
earlier statutes. Id. Thus, the court found the legislature did not intend to cover children of assisted 
reproduction. Id.  
 49. Id. at 1262–63.  
 50. Id. at 1262. The court, however, said a posthumous child cannot be a decedent’s heir if it 
would “unfairly intrude on the rights of another person or would cause serious problems in terms of 
the orderly administration of estates.” Id.  
 51. Id. at 1263. The court limited its statement by requiring an enlargement of rights be 
“consistent with the duty not to intrude unfairly upon the interests of other persons.” Id. 
 52. Id. at 1261. The court states: “[I]t would be helpful for the Legislature to deal with these 
kinds of issues.” Id. Moreover, the court warned of the potential dangers of posthumous reproduction:  
One would hope that a prospective parent thinking about causing a child to come into 
existence after the death of a genetic and biological parent would think very carefully about 
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In Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security,53 the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court outlined when Massachusetts will treat a 
posthumously conceived child as a decedent’s heir.54 Woodward marked 
the first time an American court of last resort dealt with posthumously 
conceived children’s inheritance rights.55 The court determined that a 
posthumously conceived child must prove a “genetic relationship between 
the child and the decedent.”56 Additionally, the decedent must have 
affirmatively consented57 to posthumous reproduction and support of any 
resulting child.58 Finally, even when these prerequisites exist, “time 
limitations may preclude” treating the child as the decedent’s heir.59 
The court’s determination of posthumously conceived children’s rights 
hinged on interpreting Massachusetts’ intestacy and posthumous birth 
statutes.60 Massachusetts does not expressly require posthumously born 
the potential consequences of doing that. The law should certainly be cautious about 
encouraging parents to move precipitously in this area.  
Id. at 1263.  
 53. 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002). Like Kolacy and Gillett-Netting, Woodward involved twins 
conceived using the frozen sperm of a deceased cancer patient. In 1993, Warren Woodward and his 
wife of three and a half years, Lauren, found out Warren had leukemia. Id. at 260. The couple was 
childless and feared chemotherapy would leave Warren sterile. Id. Thus, he froze his sperm before 
undergoing a bone marrow transplant. Id. He died eights months later. Id. Two years later, Lauren 
Woodward gave birth to twin girls. Id. After the twins’ birth, Lauren went to the local probate court 
and obtained a judgment amending the twins’ birth certificate to list Warren as the father. Id. The 
probate judge did not make any findings of fact; instead, the judge accepted the “[v]oluntary 
[a]cknowledgment of parentage of [the children] . . . executed by [the wife] as mother, and [the wife], 
[a]dministratrix of the estate of [the husband], for father.” Id. at 260–61. 
 54. Woodward did not rule on the factual circumstances because it was answering a question 
certified from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Id. at 260. The 
certified question asked: 
If a married man and woman arrange for sperm to be withdrawn from the husband for the 
purpose of artificially impregnating the wife, and the woman is impregnated with that sperm 
after the man, her husband, has died, will children resulting from such pregnancy enjoy the 
inheritance rights of natural children under Massachusetts’ law of intestate succession?  
Id. at 259. 
 55. Id. at 261.  
 56. Id. at 259. 
 57. For an explanation of what “affirmative consent” means, see Ronald Chester, Inheritance 
Rights of the Posthumously Conceived Child: What Exactly Does Lauren Woodward v. Commissioner 
of Social Security Decide?, 87 MASS. L. REV. 49, 49–51 (2002). Affirmative consent does not require 
an acknowledgment in writing. Id. Oral or written statements made by members of either parent’s 
family, or records from the fertility clinic, should suffice. Id. at 50. As Woodward made clear, it seems 
unlikely that the Woodward children will receive Benefits because Lauren’s purported proof of 
Warren’s consent seems dubious. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 271 n.24.  
 58. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 259, 268–72. For in depth analysis of the court’s reasoning, see 
generally Chester, supra note 57. See also Renee H. Sekino, Legal Update, Posthumous Conception: 
The Birth of a New Class, 8 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 362 (2002).  
 59. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272.  
 60. Id. at 262–64. The statute provides: “Posthumous children shall be considered as living at the 
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children to exist at their father’s death; thus, the court considered whether 
children conceived after the decedent’s death deserve the same succession 
rights as children conceived before.61 To answer this question, the court 
balanced three “powerful” state interests: “The best interest of children, 
the . . . orderly administration of estates, and the reproductive rights of the 
genetic parent.”62 Weighing these competing interests led to the court’s 
creation of its three-part test (the “Woodward Test”).63 Like the Kolacy 
court, the Woodward court urged the state legislature to address this 
subject.64 
C. Social Security 
During the Great Depression, Congress enacted the Act as “a social 
insurance program” for retired workers over age sixty-five.65 In 1939, 
Congress amended the Act,66 making benefits available to the dependents 
and survivors of workers with qualified earnings.67 Eligible survivors 
include widow(er)s, surviving children, the mother or father of an 
insured’s child, and the insured’s parents.68  
In order to qualify for survivor benefits, a child must prove two 
things.69 First, a child must meet the Act’s definition of child,70 which 
includes both legitimate71 and natural72 (illegitimate) children.73 Second, a 
death of their parent.” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190, § 8 (2004). The court noted the term “posthumous 
children” is undefined. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 264. Furthermore, the statute, unchanged in 165 
years, was adopted to deal with children in utero at the decedent’s death. Id. 
 61. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 264. 
 62. Id. at 264–65.  
 63. Currently only Massachusetts follows Woodward; however, the Ninth Circuit called it a 
“well reasoned opinion.” Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d at 596 n.3 (9th Cir. 2004).  
 64. Woodward, 760 N.E.2d at 272. The court opined: “The questions presented in this case cry 
out for lengthy, careful examination outside the adversary process, which can only address the specific 
circumstances of each controversy that presents itself. They demand a comprehensive response 
reflecting the considered will of the people.” Id.  
 65. For an in-depth discussion of the Act’s history and judicial interpretation, see Banks, supra 
note 10, at 304–57. For more information on the basic requirements needed to establish eligibility for 
Social Security, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.110–404.112 (2004).  
 66. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-666, 53 Stat. 1360, 1363–67.  
 67. See Banks, supra note 11, at 305–06. Congress later expanded the Act to include disability 
insurance and health insurance benefits. Id.  
 68. For each group’s eligibility requirements, see 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.330–404.374 (2004). 
 69. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (2000).  
 70. See id. For the Act’s definition of child, see id. § 416(e) (2000).  
 71. Black’s Law Dictionary defines legitimate child as: “Modernly, a child born or begotten in 
lawful wedlock or legitimized by the parent’s latter marriage.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 232 (7th 
ed. 1999).  
 72. Black’s Law Dictionary defines illegitimate child as: “A child that was neither born nor 
begotten in lawful wedlock nor later legitimated.” Id. Finally, it defines natural child as: “An 
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child must prove she “was dependent upon” the decedent.74 The Supreme 
Court has held children considered legitimate under state law need prove 
nothing more to receive Benefits.75 Other children must prove either 
actual76 or “deemed”77 dependency.  
A natural child is deemed dependent if she proves one of four things: 
the child can inherit under the intestacy laws of the state where the 
decedent was domiciled at his death;78 the decedent acknowledged the 
child in writing as his child before his death;79 a court decreed the 
decedent the father before his death;80 or a court ordered the decedent to 
pay child support for the child before the decedent’s death.81 The Act 
considers a child actually dependent when she proves “with satisfactory 
evidence” that the decedent was “the father . . . and was living with or 
contributing to the support” of the child when he died (the “Living with 
Test”).82 Congress added the last four criteria for determining dependency 
illegitimate child acknowledged by the father. An illegitimate child.” Id. at 232–33. 
 73. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2000) (defining child). See also 20 C.F.R. § 404.354 (2004) 
(discussing what are permissible relationships to the insured). This Note will focus on legitimate and 
natural children. The Act also deals with stepchildren, adopted children, and grandchildren. For a 
discussion of these children, see Banks, supra note 11, at 311–20.  
 74. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(C) (2000).  
 75. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 635 (1974). 
 76. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii) (2000). The provision states that dependency exists when: “such 
insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner of Social Security to have 
been the mother or father of the applicant, and such insured individual was living with or contributing 
to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died.” Id.  
 77. Id. § 416(h)(2)(A). The provision states: 
In determining whether an applicant is the child or parent of a fully or currently insured 
individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply 
such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of intestate personal property by 
the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant 
files application, or, if such insured individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he 
was domiciled at the time of his death, or, if such insured individual is or was not so 
domiciled in any State, by the courts of the District of Columbia. Applicants who according 
to such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property as a child 
or parent shall be deemed such. 
Id.  
 78. See id.  
 79. Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(I). 
 80. Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(II). 
 81. Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(i)(III). 
 82. Id. § 416(h)(3)(C)(ii). For the section’s text, see supra, note 76. This provision, which 
examines whether actual dependency exists, is considered the “last resort test.” See Banks, supra note 
11, at 345.  
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in 1965,83 after realizing the Act relied too heavily upon state intestacy 
laws, to the detriment of natural children.84  
The Supreme Court examined the constitutionality of treating natural 
and legitimate children differently in Jimenez v. Weinberger85 and 
Mathews v. Lucas.86 In Jimenez, two illegitimate children, who did not 
meet the Act’s dependency requirements,87 appealed their rejection of 
disability insurance benefits.88 The Court held the denial of benefits 
violated the “equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the due process 
provision of the Fifth Amendment.”89 It explained the Act divided 
afterborn illegitimate children into two classes: those that can become 
legitimated (receive benefits) and those who cannot become legitimated 
(receive no benefits).90 It found these classes both “over inclusive” and 
“under inclusive.”91 After recognizing the government’s legitimate interest 
in preventing spurious claims,92 the Court held this interest was not 
“reasonably related” to “the blanket and conclusive exclusion of 
 83. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (amending the Act to expand coverage 
for medical insurance and to increase benefits under old age, survivor, and disability insurance).  
 84. The legislative history states:  
[I]n a national program that is intended to pay benefits to replace support lost by a child when 
his father retires, dies, or becomes disabled, whether a child gets benefits should not depend 
on whether he can inherit his father’s intestate personal property under the laws of the State in 
which his father happens to live.  
S. REP. NO. 89-404, at 110 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 2050. 
 85. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).  
 86. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).  
 87. As the Court explained, benefits “were denied solely because they are proscribed illegitimate 
children who were not dependent on Jimenez at the time of the onset of his disability.” Jimenez, 417 
U.S. at 631. Furthermore, the children could not use state intestacy law to be deemed dependent 
because Illinois law barred non-legitimated children from taking in intestacy. Id. at 630. Finally, the 
children did not meet the Living with Test because “neither child’s paternity had been acknowledged 
or affirmed through evidence of domicile and support before the onset of their father’s disability.” Id. 
at 631. 
 88. Id. at 630–31. Under the Act, the requirements for insurance based on death and disability are 
virtually identical. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2000). At the time of Jimenez, the Act required the 
Living with Test to be met at the onset of the disability. Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 630–31. At present, the 
Act requires the Living with Test be met “at the time such applicant’s application for benefits was 
filed.” 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(B)(ii) (2000). 
 89. Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 637.  
 90. Id. at 635–36. 
 91. Id. at 637. 
 92. The government argued the Act’s purpose is “to provide support for dependents of a wage 
earner who has lost his earning power, and that the provisions excluding some afterborn illegitimates 
from recovery are designed to only prevent spurious claims and ensure that those actually entitled to 
benefit receive payments.” Id. at 633–34. Furthermore, the government argued denying the Jimenez 
class benefits was proper because “it is ‘likely’ that these illegitimates, as a class, will not possess the 
requisite economic dependency on the wage earner” and that “eligibility for such illegitimates would 
open the door to spurious claims.” Id. at 634.  
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appellant’s subclass of illegitimates.”93 Because the potential for spurious 
claims was equal in both classes, to deny one “benefits presumptively 
available to the other” violates the Fifth Amendment.94 
Two years later, the Court decided Mathews v. Lucas.95 Here, two 
illegitimate children, whose deceased father neither acknowledged his 
paternity nor lived with or supported the children at his death,96 appealed 
their Benefits denial.97 The Court had to determine if forcing these 
children to prove actual dependency at the father’s death violated the Fifth 
Amendment.98 As a preface to its decision upholding the denial’s 
constitutionality, the Court explained the Act is “not a general welfare 
provision,” but was designed to “replace support lost by a child when his 
father . . . dies.”99 It found the statutory classifications permissible because 
they are “reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at death.”100 
Finally, the Court found the government’s interest in administrative 
convenience met the required scrutiny.101 Thus, the children’s denial did 
not violate the Fifth Amendment. The Court distinguished Jimenez, 
explaining the Jimenez children had no opportunity to prove dependency 
while the Lucas children could still do so.102 Furthermore, it pointed to the 
more carefully drawn distinctions between legitimates and illegitimates in 
the context of survivor benefits.103 In his dissent, Justice Stevens believed 
 93. Id. at 636.  
 94. Id. at 636–37. 
 95. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).  
 96. Id. at 497.  
 97. Id. at 497–98.  
 98. Id. at 497.  
 99. Id. at 507.  
 100. Id. at 508–09. The Court did not use their most “exacting scrutiny” because discrimination 
based on legitimacy does not “command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process.” Id. at 506 (quoting San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). 
 101. Matthews, 427 U.S. at 509–11.  
 102. Id. at 511–13. The Court explained: 
But this conclusiveness in denying benefits to some classes of afterborn illegitimate children, 
which belied the asserted legislative reliance on dependency in Jimenez, is absent here, for, as 
we have noted, any otherwise eligible child may qualify for survivorship benefits by showing 
contribution to support, or cohabitation, at the time of death. 
Id. at 512. 
 103. Id. at 513. The Court opined: “Here, by contrast, the statute does not broadly discriminate 
between legitimates and illegitimates without more, but is carefully tuned to alternative considerations. 
The presumption of dependency is withheld only in the absence of any significant indication of the 
likelihood of actual dependency.” Id. at 513. 
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Jimenez controlled104 and characterized the majority’s ruling as little more 
than the perpetuation of traditional thinking about illegitimates.105 
Given this precedent and the Act’s language, the only viable option for 
a posthumously conceived child to receive Benefits is either being found 
the decedent’s heir,106 which means relying on inconsistent state laws, or 
proving actual dependence under the Living with Test.107 Although 
posthumously conceived children seem unlikely to satisfy the Living with 
Test, posthumously born children provide a similar, and previously 
adjudicated, fact pattern. Federal circuits, however, are split on how to 
apply the Living with Test to posthumously born children.108 
Initially, courts applied either a regular and substantial support test or a 
regular and continuous support test.109 In Adams v. Weinberger,110 the 
Second Circuit abandoned this standard because it creates a result for 
which the Act does not call: excluding almost all posthumously born 
children.111 This result occurs because unborn children depend solely on 
their mother.112 The Second Circuit then proposed the commensurate 
support standard (the “Commensurate Standard”), looking at “whether the 
support by the father for the unborn child was commensurate with the 
needs of the unborn child at the time of the father's death.”113 The Second 
Circuit awarded Benefits because the deceased father’s contribution of one 
hundred dollars for a hospital bill was commensurate with the child’s 
needs.114 
In Boyland v. Califano,115 the Sixth Circuit also abandoned the “regular 
and substantial”116 standard.117 The Second Circuit explained the “regular 
 104. Id. at 516–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens summed up his dissent succinctly, “I 
am unable to identify a relevant difference between Jimenez and this case.” Id. at 518.  
 105. Id. at 518–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens declared: “I am persuaded that the 
classification which is sustained today in the name of ‘administrative convenience’ is more probably 
the product of a tradition of thinking of illegitimates as less deserving persons than legitimates.” Id. at 
523.  
 106. See supra notes 78–84 and accompanying text.  
 107. See id. 
 108. See infra notes 109–29 and accompanying text.  
 109. Boyland v. California, 633 F.2d 430, 433–34 (6th Cir. 1980).  
 110. Adams v. Wainberger, 521 F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 111. Id. at 660. The Second Circuit noted Benefits should not be denied in marginal cases and the 
Adams child did not present a danger of “‘spurious’ claims.” Id. at 659. 
 112. Id. at 660. 
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. at 660–61.  
 115. 633 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 116. Over time, the Social Security Administration has changed its regulations so that they are 
more in line with the thinking of the courts. For a history of the now replaced “regular and substantial” 
standard, see id. at 433–34 n.12. The current Social Security regulations state: “Contributions must be 
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and substantial” standard only operates fairly when the deceased has a 
regular and substantial income.118 In Boyland, the deceased did not; thus, 
the Sixth Circuit adopted a new standard, examining the deceased’s 
contributions in light of his economic condition (the “Economic 
Standard”).119 The court awarded Benefits because the deceased 
contributed what he could afford.120  
The Ninth Circuit addressed posthumously born children in Doran v. 
Schweiker.121 Here, the deceased father122 publicly acknowledged the 
child’s paternity;123 however, his only contributions were fixing the 
mother’s roof during a rainstorm and helping her move.124 The Ninth 
Circuit created its own standard, a hybrid of the Economic and 
Commensurate Standards (the “Doran Standard”).125 Using this standard, 
the Ninth Circuit awarded Benefits, holding the deceased father supported 
the unborn fetus according to its needs and his means.126 
Using these standards, courts have been able to award more 
posthumously born children Benefits.127 Yet the Doran standard, the 
made regularly and must be large enough to meet an important part of your ordinary living costs.” 20 
C.F.R. § 404.366 (2004).  
 117. Boyland, 633 F.2d at 434. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id. The court stated: “Instead, attention should be focused on whether the contributions that 
were made to the support of his children were important to them given their needs and the wage 
earner’s economic circumstances and ability to support.” Id. 
 120. Id. Buying the children lunch and small presents, along with gifts of five to ten dollars on 
numerous occasions, met the Economic Standard. Id.  
 121. 681 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1982).  
 122. Id. at 606. The deceased committed suicide three months before the child’s birth. Id.  
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 608–09. 
 126. Id. at 610.  
 127. See Wolfe v. Sullivan, 988 F.2d 1025, 1029 (10th Cir. 1993). In Wolfe, the Tenth Circuit 
adopted the Commensurate Standard and held supporting the mother is enough to meet it. Id. The 
Wolfe court denied Benefits because the deceased father stopped giving the child’s mother gifts upon 
learning of her pregnancy. Id. at 1028–29.  
 See also Smith v. Heckler, 820 F.2d 1093, 1096–97 (9th Cir. 1987) (father who did not know of 
child before death supported child because he supported the mother); Parsons for Bryant v. Health and 
Human Servs., 762 F.2d 1188, 1191 (4th Cir. 1985) (payments totaling fifty dollars to provide 
transportation to doctor’s visit were sufficient where father died in fifth month of pregnancy); Wharton 
ex rel. Wharton v. Bowen, 710 F. Supp. 903, 906 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (child awarded Benefits where 
child’s mother was five months pregnant with the child and living with the deceased at his death); 
Younger ex rel. Younger v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 667 F. Supp. 531, 534–35 (W.D. 
Mich. 1987), rev’d, 856 F.2d 197 (6th Cir. 1988) (contribution of two hundred dollars to pay mother’s 
living expenses met required level of support); Gay ex rel. McBride v. Heckler, 583 F. Supp. 499, 
503–04 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (paying no support to the mother, but buying baby clothes for the unborn 
child meets support requirement). For a collection of cases which construe the Act liberally, see 
Banks, supra note 11, at 317–18. 
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controlling standard for Gillett-Netting, cannot expand to include every 
scenario,128 and some circuits still follow the Social Security Regulations’ 
standard.129 Thus, the Doran Standard’s availability (along with the 
Commensurate and Economic Standards) to posthumously conceived 
children seems questionable because no opportunity existed for the 
deceased father to support either the unborn fetus or the pregnant mother.  
D. The Gillett-Netting Decisions 
The district court ruled against the Twins because they did not meet the 
Act’s definition of child.130 It explained the Social Security Regulations 
require natural children prove they can take from the deceased in 
intestacy.131 According to the district court, although Arizona treats 
legitimate and illegitimate children equally,132 it also requires a descendent 
to “survive” the decedent.133 Because the Twins did not survive Netting, 
they met neither Arizona’s nor the Act’s requirements.134 
In dicta, the district court explained why the Twins would have failed 
the Act’s dependency requirements.135 First, the Twins could not prove 
actual dependency.136 Without significant explanation, the district court 
also believed the Twins could not be deemed dependent as legitimated 
children,137 foreclosing the Twins only other method of proving 
 128. See Orsini ex rel. Orsini v. Sullivan, 903 F.2d 1393, 1393–96 (11th Cir. 1990) (denying 
benefits to a posthumously born child who was a one-week-old fetus at time of father’s death because 
the mother received no support from the father; thus the child was not dependent); Chester ex rel. 
Chester v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 808 F.2d 473, 477 (6th Cir. 1987) (single gift of thirty 
dollars does not satisfy the Living with Test); Johnson ex rel. Bryant v. Sec’y of Health and Human 
Servs., 801 F.2d 797, 799 (6th Cir. 1986) (posthumously born child did not receive Benefits because 
father provided neither support to the mother nor set aside funds for the child); Jones v. Schweiker, 
668 F.2d 755, 758 n.5 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated 460 U.S. 1077 (1983) (contributions to mother before 
conception were not made because of possible pregnancy and are not support for the child).  
 129. See Allen ex rel. Allen v. Callahan, 120 F.3d 86, 87 (7th Cir. 1997) (reaffirming the Seventh 
Circuit’s adherence to the “regular and substantial” test).  
 130. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966–67 (D. Ariz. 2002), rev’d 371 F.3d 593 
(9th Cir. 2004).  
 131. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 965–66. The regulations list four ways for natural children 
to be eligible, which are identical to those listed in the Social Security Act. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 416 
(2000), with 20 C.F.R. § 04.355(a)(1)-(4) (2004).  
 132. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 966. Arizona law treats a person as “the child of that 
person’s natural parents, regardless of their marital status.” Id.  
 133. Id.  
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. See also Ronald R. Volkmer, Status of Posthumously Conceived Children, 30 EST. PLAN. 
252, 252 (2003) (characterizing the dependency discussion as dicta and explaining the decision).  
 136. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 967. 
 137. Id. The district court’s reasoning in this case seems incomplete. It supported its conclusions 
as follows:  
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dependency.138 The district court then distinguished Woodward139 and 
Kolacy140 as unpersuasive because they did not apply Arizona law.141 
Finally, the district court cited Lucas as a defense to the Twins’ equal 
protection claim.142 
On appeal the Ninth Circuit reversed after concluding the Act’s 
definition of child only applies when parentage is disputed.143 
Furthermore, it held that the Twins were dependent because Arizona treats 
them as legitimate children (who need prove nothing more to receive 
Benefits).144 It found the Twins were Netting’s children because both the 
Social Security Administration and Gillett stipulated that he was their 
biological father.145 The Ninth Circuit then examined whether the Twins 
met the Act’s dependency requirements.146 Although it agreed the Twins 
could not demonstrate actual dependency,147 it deemed the twins 
dependent because “Arizona has eliminated the status of illegitimacy,”148 
and considers every child the legitimate child of its natural parents.149 
Quoting Lucas, the Ninth Circuit opined: “All legitimate children, are 
statutorily entitled . . . to survivorship benefits regardless of actual 
dependency.”150 The Ninth Circuit was careful to emphasize that its 
As to the legitimacy element, Arizona treats all children as legitimate by statute. This statue, 
however, was enacted to prevent the State from treating children of unwed parents differently 
than children of married parents. The statute does not salvage Plaintiff’s claim in this case. In 
any event, whether Juliet and Pier’s are Robert’s “legitimate” children as defined by the Act 
is irrelevant as they do not meet the “child” requirement of § 402(d).  
Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 138. For an explanation of dependency under the Act, see supra notes 70–84 and accompanying 
text.  
 139. Gillett-Netting, 231 F. Supp. 2d at 968.  
 140. Id. at 968–69.  
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 969–70. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not discuss this issue because it ruled in favor 
of the Twins. See infra notes 143–50 and accompanying text. 
 143. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 597–99 (9th Cir. 2004). See supra notes 69–84 and 
accompanying text. 
 144. They are deemed dependent under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) because Jimenez held children 
considered legitimate under state law are entitled to Benefits without proving more. See Jimenez v. 
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 623, 635 (1974).  
 145. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 597. The Ninth Circuit noted that the Social Security 
Commissioner did not dispute that Netting was the Twins’ biological father. Id.  
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 597–98. 
 148. Id. at 598–99 (quoting State v. Mejia, 399 P.2d 116, 117 (1965)). Arizona law states: “Every 
child is the legitimate child of its natural parents and is entitled to support and education as if born in 
lawful wedlock.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-601 (1999).  
 149. Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598–99.  
 150. Id.  
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decision hinged on Arizona law legitimating the Twins.151 It cautioned that 
its holding neither applies uniformly to all posthumously-conceived 
children152 nor determines the Twins’ intestacy rights under Arizona 
law.153 
III. ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit reached the proper result in Gillett-Netting. Courts 
liberally construe the Act because they consider it remedial and lean 
towards inclusion in marginal cases such as Gillett-Netting.154 Moreover, 
the Twins should not lose their right to Benefits based solely on the timing 
of their birth. Although Netting and Gillett’s marriage technically ended at 
Netting’s death, their repeated attempts at conception indicated their desire 
to conceive a legitimate child.155 The only difference between a 
posthumously born legitimate child (who only need prove that the 
mother’s deceased husband is its father) and the Twins, is Gillett’s 
difficulty getting pregnant, which delayed conception until after Netting’s 
death. It seems unfair to deny Benefits based solely on this difficulty. 
Furthermore, this timing issue does not create a danger of spurious claims, 
leaving the government with the weaker rationale of administrative 
convenience to support the denial.156 While this denial still appears 
constitutional under Lucas, awarding Benefits using the legitimacy 
argument ensured a fair result.  
The Ninth Circuit also reached the proper result because the district 
court’s reasoning appeared incomplete and unreasonably dismissive of the 
Twins’ valid arguments. While the district court’s interpretation of 
Arizona intestacy law is plausible,157 it seems contrary to both the Act’s 
 151. Id.  
 152. Id. at 599 n.7. In this footnote, the Ninth Circuit explains that if the sperm donor had not 
married the mother, Arizona would not treat him as the child’s natural parent, and, if alive, he would 
have no obligation to support the child. Id. The child would then have to prove dependency under the 
Act. Id. 
 153. Id. at 599 n.8.  
 154. See Adams v. Weinberger, 521 F.2d 656, 659 (explaining “[t]he Social Security Act is 
remedial and its humanitarian aims necessitate that it be construed broadly and applied liberally.”); 
Henry Broderick, Inc. v. Squire, 163 F.2d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 1947) (explaining “it has been 
consistently held that a narrow and legalistic interpretation of the scope of the Act here in question 
would not be in conformance with the broad purposes of federal social security legislation.”). 
 155. Technically, Gillett and Netting were not married at the Twins’ birth because a marriage ends 
at the death of one the partners. 52 AM. JUR. 2D. Marriage § 8 (2000).  
 156. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 157. The Ninth Circuit avoided discussing Arizona’s survivorship requirement relied on by the 
district court. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. A plausible explanation is that the only issue 
for deciding the Benefits question is whether the children are legitimate, not if they survived Netting.  
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recognized remedial nature and Arizona’s facially liberal laws.158 
Moreover, the district court’s discussion of dependency eroded the 
opinion’s credibility by writing off the Twins’ legitimacy argument 
without significant explanation.159 Failing to sufficiently distinguish 
Woodward and Kolacy, the only cases examining posthumously conceived 
children’s rights, continued the credibility erosion.160 Moreover, the 
district court could have certified the intestacy question to the Arizona 
Supreme Court.161 Finally, if the Ninth Circuit had adopted the district 
court’s reasoning, it would leave posthumously conceived children with 
no way of receiving Benefits. 
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning does raise some red flags.162 First, 
circumventing the district court’s argument about the definition of child 
implies that the Ninth Circuit either did not want to determine the Twins’ 
intestacy status in Arizona or did not believe the definition included the 
Twins. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit’s attempt to explain away this 
definition failed.163 The Ninth Circuit claimed the definition of child relied 
on by the district court only applies when the “parents were never 
married”;164 however, it improperly applied precedent to support this 
proposition.165 Although the Ninth Circuit properly avoided the intestacy 
question, its avoidance of the district court’s argument creates the 
possibility that merely disputing paternity will derail future Benefits 
claims by posthumously conceived children. Next, the Ninth Circuit seems 
to foreclose any possibility of proving dependency outside of state 
intestacy and legitimacy laws.166 This leaves posthumously conceived 
 158. See supra note 154.  
 159. See supra notes 130–35 and accompanying text.  
 160. See supra notes 139–42 and accompanying text. The district court, however, had the right to 
ignore Woodward and Kolacy because they are not controlling authority.  
 161. See supra note 54. 
 162. One author correctly asserts that the Gillett-Netting approach necessitates a case-by-case 
analysis, which seems contrary to Social Security Administration’s goal of categorical decision 
making. See Karen Minor, Note, Posthumously Conceived Children and Social Security Survivor’s 
Benefits: Implications of the Ninth Circuit’s Novel Approach for Determining Eligibility in Gillett-
Netting v. Barnhart, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 85, 108 (2005). This assertion, however, ignores 
that the fact that courts already apply a case-by-case analysis with posthumously born children, and 
that the Ninth Circuit’s decision to apply it to posthumously conceived children seems like a logical 
extension of this philosophy. See supra notes 106–26 and accompanying text 
 163. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 597 n.4 (9th Cir. 2004). 
 164. Id.  
 165. See id. (citing Campbell ex rel. Campbell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 890, 891–92 (9th Cir. 1999)).  
 166. By not mentioning any other possible avenues for proving dependency, the Ninth Circuit 
makes it clear that Arizona law rescued the Twins’ claim. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit explained 
that its ruling does not establish the Twins as Netting’s heir under Arizona law. Gillett-Netting, 371 
F.3d at 599 n.8. Thus, it relied heavily on the legitimacy argument. 
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children in the position of illegitimate children before 1965167—totally 
reliant on inconsistent state laws—but Congress did not intend this 
position for any category of illegitimate (natural) children.168 Furthermore, 
it means the deceased father’s state of residence,169 as opposed to his 
consent or support, becomes the sole basis for determining whether 
posthumously-conceived children may receive Benefits.170 
As a result, the Ninth Circuit should have created, or adopted, a test to 
prove the Twins were actually dependent. First, the Ninth Circuit could 
have applied the Doran standard.171 Netting’s notice of his sperm’s 
possible use in posthumous conception, his statements to Gillett, and her 
continuing fertility treatments172 should constitute support to the Twins 
under the Doran standard.173 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit could have 
adopted the Woodward Test for determining actual dependency in 
situations involving posthumously conceived children.174 Netting and the 
Twins satisfy the test’s first prong because they share a genetic 
relationship.175 The Twins partially satisfy the second prong because 
Netting’s comments to Gillett suggest he affirmatively consented to 
posthumous conception using his sperm.176 More proof, such as evidence 
that Netting paid for his sperm’s storage or the fertility treatments, would 
likely be necessary to prove Netting consented to supporting 
posthumously conceived children.177 The Twins also satisfy the third 
 167. For a discussion of the Act’s legislative history, see supra notes 80–81 and accompanying 
text.  
 168. See supra note 159. 
 169. In fact, a recent decision by a federal district court supports this conclusion. In Stephen v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2005 WL 2210651 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2005), the court held that a child, who was 
conceived with sperm extracted from his dead “father,” was not eligible for benefits because under 
Florida law this child could not bring a claim against the father’s estate. Id. at *4–6. The court also 
distinguished Gillett-Netting because it applied Arizona, and not Florida, law. Id. at *6.  
 Similarly, the Social Security Administration recently issued a notice stating it would follow 
Gillett-Netting throughout the Ninth Circuit. See Social Security Administration Acquiesce Ruling 05-
1(9), Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart; Application of State Law and the Social Security Act in Determining 
Eligibility for a Child Conceived by Artificial Means after an Insured Individual’s Death, 70 Fed. Reg. 
55656 (Sept. 22, 2005).  
 170. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(i) (2000).  
 171. See supra notes 121–26 and accompanying text.  
 172. See supra notes 16–18 and accompanying text.  
 173. In fact, Netting’s actions seem stronger evidence of support than most courts have relied on 
to find support in cases of posthumously born children. See supra note 124. Evidence that Netting paid 
at least part of the expenses for either the sperm’s storage or Gillett’s fertility treatments would 
strengthen the indicia of support.  
 174. Like the Doran Standard, which applies to posthumously born children, courts could employ 
the Woodward Test with posthumously conceived children.  
 175. See supra note 145. 
 176. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text.  
 177. It is hard to find a difference between this kind of support and a father paying a one hundred 
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prong because their birth occurred within a reasonable time after Netting’s 
death.178 Although the Woodward Test was not created to interact with the 
Act’s definitions, its requirements promote the government’s concern for 
preventing spurious claims179 while providing posthumously conceived 
children with a chance to prove actual dependency. The Ninth Circuit took 
the safer route to awarding Benefits, but adopting either the Woodward 
Test or Doran Standard would have given posthumously conceived 
children a method of proving dependency when they reside in states with 
unhelpful intestacy and legitimacy laws.180 Obviously, in states granting 
posthumously conceived children inheritance rights these tests would be 
unnecessary.181  
IV. PROPOSAL 
As Woodward and Kolacy correctly warned, this problem’s ultimate 
resolution lies with legislatures.182 Congress should amend the Act, adding 
a section allowing posthumously conceived children to receive Benefits.183 
The new section would provide a last resort test for posthumously 
conceived children.184 It would blend elements of the Woodward Test185 
and various state laws granting posthumously conceived children 
inheritance rights.186 The new section would state that if a genetic 
relationship is proven, a child shall be deemed dependent if the decedent 
consented187 to posthumous conception using his genetic material and (1) 
dollar hospital bill. See supra notes 109–14 and accompanying text. Compare supra note 127 (listing 
support that met the Living with Test), with supra note 128 (listing support that did not meet the 
Living with Test). Obviously, Netting providing for the Twins’ support in his will would suffice. 
 178. See supra note 19. 
 179. See supra note 92.  
 180. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.  
 181. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.  
 182. See supra notes 52, 64 and accompanying text.  
 183. One Note has recommended that changes in the Social Security Regulation or state laws will 
adequately address this problem. See Ann-Patton Nelson, Casenote, A New Era of Dead-Beat Dads: 
Determining Social Security Survivor’s Benefits for Children Who Are Posthumously Conceived, 56 
MERCER L. REV. 759, 775–76 (2005). This approach has two major flaws. First, relying on state law 
does not resolve the problem because it still leads to differing treatment for similarly situated children. 
Second, as suggested by the Woodward and Kolacy courts, the legislature, and not an administrative 
agency, is the proper venue for change. See supra notes 52, 64. Another author, without providing 
specific guidelines, has called for a clarification of statutory language on both a state and federal level. 
See Minor, supra note 163, at 108.  
 184. See Banks, supra note 11, at 317 (referring to the Living with Test as the “last resort test”).  
 185. See supra notes 62–64 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra notes 36–39 and accompanying text.  
 187. A possible solution would require all sperm banks to discuss posthumous conception with 
their non-anonymous donors. See Burkdall, supra note 10, at 905–06 (offering a proposed plan for 
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the decedent was married to the mother at the time of his death; (2) the 
decedent was living with or contributing to the mother’s support at the 
time of his death; or (3) the decedent provided for any posthumously 
conceived child, using his non-anonymously donated sperm, in his will.188 
Furthermore, the new provision would require that the children be born 
within three years of the deceased’s death.189  
This scheme, for example, would make the Twins eligible because they 
share a genetic relationship with Netting, he consented to posthumous 
conception, he was married to Gillett at his death, and they were born 
within three years of his death.190 Similarly, this scheme provides Benefits 
for posthumously conceived children whose parents never married, but 
whose parents meet the requirements.191  
More importantly, this proposal allows some posthumously conceived 
children to receive Benefits but prevents spurious claims and keeps Social 
Security from becoming a general welfare provision.192 It avoids this result 
by requiring the decedent’s consent along with a provable relationship 
between the posthumously conceived child’s mother and the decedent. For 
example, Jeremy Reno’s mother could find a willing woman to carry, and 
birth, Jeremy’s child.193 This child, however, would be ineligible for 
Benefits because Jeremy neither consented to posthumous conception nor 
knew the birth mother.194 Similarly, any child Mirabel Baez conceives 
requiring extensive documentation of consent at the time of donation). If the donor wanted to consent, 
he could sign a form at that time. This proposal would alleviate many of the proof issues. If there is no 
form signed at this time, this creates a rebutable presumption of non-consent. Installing this system 
would also work as a safeguard against spurious claims because, in the absence of a signed form, the 
rebutable presumption makes proving consent difficult.  
 188. Obviously, some government body will need to decide what standard of consent is needed 
and what does and does not fall into the category of contribution. For a discussion of different types of 
consent, see Chester, supra note 57. The Social Security Administration should deal with these kinds 
of issues.  
 189. This requirement would allow the widow time not only to grieve but also to attempt 
conception. See Chester, supra note 31, at 736–39. As Professor Chester explains, anything shorter 
than three years does not give a woman the proper amount of time to become pregnant using assisted 
reproduction. See id. at 738. Furthermore, this requirement prevents the government from supporting 
children born an unreasonably long time after their father’s death. See id. at 736–39 (explaining how 
this time limitation affects the distribution of estates).  
 190. See supra notes 16–18. 
 191. It would make little sense, given the Act’s inclusion of other illegitimate children, to require 
the birth mother to have been married to the sperm provider. For example, this section could extend to 
situations where a couple was engaged but were never married, or a solider who died in battle before 
having a chance to conceive with fiancée or girlfriend. Furthermore, it would apply to a couple like 
Kane and Hecht. See supra notes 2–3 and accompanying text. 
 192. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.  
 193. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.  
 194. See supra note 188. 
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using her dead husband’s sperm would be ineligible for Benefits because 
the husband did not consent to posthumous conception.195 This proposal 
prevents the government from supporting children it would not normally 
support.196 Finally, this proposal discourages women in any of the above 
situations from conceiving a deceased’s child because it prevents them 
from receiving any government support for themselves or the child.197  
This proposal strikes a balance between reproductive freedom, the 
child’s best interests, and the government’s policy interests. While it 
obviously requires posthumously conceived children to meet more 
requirements than a legitimate child or certain classes of illegitimate 
children, it prevents their de jure exclusion. Furthermore, it creates a 
usable test to prove dependency that does not rely on state law.198 Finally, 
enacting this section will avoid litigation by posthumously conceived 
children that challenge the Act’s constitutionality. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress must address this problem. Posthumous conception using 
assisted reproduction is not a passing phenomenon. As technology 
advances, posthumous conception will continue to increase in 
popularity.199 Both the judiciary200 and commentators201 have urged 
legislative action. Other developed nations have formulated policies, and 
America should follow their lead.202 Without congressional guidance to 
ensure consistent treatment, similarly situated children will receive 
inconsistent treatment from the federal government. Answering the 
Benefits question now will allow Congress to lay the foundation for a 
 195. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. This proposal would not have caused a different 
result in Stephens v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2005 WL 2210651 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 7, 2005), because Gar 
Stephens, the deceased husband, did not consent to a post-mortem sperm extraction—or conception. 
Id. at *1–6. 
 196. See supra note 128. For example, someone like Kane could not bequeath his vials of sperm 
to “any willing woman” to conceive my child for public policy reasons. Burkdall, supra note 10, at 
903–04.  
 197. See supra notes 10, 69–84. 
 198. See supra notes 83–84. 
 199. See supra note 7. 
 200. See supra notes 52, 64 and accompanying text.  
 201. See supra notes 1–11, 23–39 and accompanying text. See also Ronald Volkmer, 
Posthumously Conceived Children Eligible for Social Security, 31 EST. PLAN. 564 (2004) 
(characterizing the legislative treatment of this subject at both state and federal level as inadequate).  
 202. See supra note 30.  
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cohesive policy addressing the complex issues created by assisted 
reproduction and life cycle manipulation.203  
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 203. For example, human cloning and genetically engineered children. 
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